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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important 
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT – DISCIPLINE – DECEPTION OF COURT 
OR OBSTRUCTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota 
v. Cynthia M. Feland 
In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland2 involved an objection by 
both Cynthia Feland and Disciplinary Counsel to the report of an attorney 
disciplinary hearing panel finding Feland had violated North Dakota Rule 
of Professional Conduct 3.8(d).3  The recommended sanction by the panel 
was a sixty day suspension, and for Feland to pay the costs of the 
proceeding totaling $11,272.21.4  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
adopted the panel’s finding on the violation, but imposed more lenient 
sanctions for the violation.5 
Feland at the time in issue was an Assistant State’s Attorney in 
Burleigh County.6  The allegation of professional misconduct arose out of 
Feland’s prosecution of Charles Blunt.7  Feland prosecuted Blunt for 
misapplication of entrusted property.8  Blunt was the executive director of 
Workforce Safety and Insurance, and one of the issues in his criminal 
prosecution was whether he failed to pursue the repayment of some 
employee expenses WSI had paid to one of its hires.9  A WSI employee was 
hired, and had his relocation expenses paid by WSI, contingent on 
repayment of half the expenses if the employee left WSI within two years.10  
The employee left within two years, but Blunt did not attempt to recoup 
those expenses.11  An audit of the WSI finances turned up the unrecouped 
expenses.12  Blunt told the auditors the employee had actually been forced 
to resign, and that is why he did not pursue recovering the expenses.13  
Based on that, the auditors did not further push the expense recoupment.14  
Feland, during the criminal investigation of Blunt, asked one of the auditors 
to draft a memorandum about the relocation expense issue, which the 
 
2. 2012 ND 174, 820 N.W.2d 672. 
3. Feland, ¶ 1, 820 N.W.2d at 675. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. ¶ 2. 
7. Id. 
8. Id.  This prosecution was before the North Dakota Supreme Court three separate times.  
State v. Blunt, 2011 ND 127, 799 N.W.2d 363; State v. Blunt, 2010 ND 144, 785 N.W.2d 909; 
State v. Blunt, 2008 ND 135, 751 N.W.2d 692. 
9. Feland, ¶ 2. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. ¶ 3. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
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auditor drafted.15  At Blunt’s criminal trial, the auditor testified about 
Blunt’s failure to recoup the expenses.16  Following his conviction, Blunt 
brought a motion to vacate his conviction arguing the State had violated 
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 for failing to turn over the 
auditor’s memo in pretrial discovery.17 
At the disciplinary evidentiary hearing, the panel was presented 
conflicting accounts of whether Feland had turned over the auditor’s memo 
to Blunt.18  Feland testified she had given the memo to her legal assistant, 
and the legal assistant testified she thought the memo was provided, but was 
not sure.19  The memo was not noted on the State’s Attorney’s discovery 
checklist in the Blunt file.20  Blunt’s attorney testified the document was not 
provided to him in pretrial discovery.21  The hearing panel held failure to 
disclose the memo was a violation of North Dakota Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.8(d).22  The panel recommended that Feland’s license to practice 
law be suspended for sixty days and she be required to pay the full costs of 
the disciplinary proceeding.23 
Feland made several arguments on appeal, the first being, that the 
findings on Blunt’s post-conviction motion appeal that Blunt had not been 
prejudiced simply foreclosed a finding of professional misconduct.24  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting the Rules of 
Professional Conduct are concerned with the ethical conduct of attorneys 
whereas the Rules of Criminal Procedure are not.25  The court held the 
strength of the prosecutor’s case or prejudice to the criminal defendant does 
not change where the ethical duty to disclose was violated.26  Accordingly, 
the court held the failure to establish a violation of North Dakota Rule of 
 
15. Id. ¶ 4, 820 N.W.2d at 675-76. 
16. Id. ¶ 5, 820 N.W.2d at 676. 
17. Id. ¶ 6.  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Blunt’s post-conviction 
motion because he was not prejudiced by the failure to disclose.  Id. 
18. Id. ¶ 7. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. ¶ 8.  That provision states 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: 
(d) disclose to the defense at the earliest practical time all evidence or information 
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal 
all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the 
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. 
N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8(d). 
23. Feland, ¶ 8, 820 N.W.2d at 676-77. 
24. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 820 N.W.2d at 677-78. 
25. Id. ¶ 13, 820 N.W.2d at 678. 
26. Id. 
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Criminal Procedure 16 by the defendant in a criminal case is not a defense 
to the prosecutor in a professional misconduct proceeding.27 
Feland next argued a violation of Rule 3.8(d) should only be found 
where there is clear and convincing evidence of intentionally withholding 
exculpatory evidence.28  Disciplinary Counsel argued even knowing or 
negligent failure to disclose violates Rule 3.8(d).29  After reviewing 
different jurisdictions’ and commentators approaches to Rule 3.8(d), the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held any failure to disclose is a violation.30  
The plain language of the Rule has no mens rea requirement, and as such, 
the court would not graft a mens rea requirement onto the Rule.31  The court 
also noted that adopting an intentional failure to disclose standard could 
lead to abusive practice in prosecutor’s discovery practices, such as having 
no tracking of evidence disclosure.32  The standard is not one of strict 
liability, however, and any of the three levels of culpable conduct under the 
North Dakota Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions – 3.0, intentional, 
knowingly, and negligently, are required.33  Thus, even the negligent failure 
to disclose is now a violation of Rule 3.8(d), with the level of intent 
primarily affecting the appropriate level of sanction to impose.34 
  
 
27. Id. ¶ 14. 
28. Id. ¶ 15, 820 N.W.2d at 678-79. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. ¶ 22, 820 N.W.2d at 680. 
31. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. 
32. Id. ¶ 23, 820 N.W.2d at 680-81. 
33. Id. ¶ 24, 820 N.W.2d at 681. 
34. See id. ¶¶ 40-42, 820 N.W.2d at 684-85. 
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BURGLARY – INSTRUCTIONS – AS TO INTENT 
State of North Dakota v. Trevor Lance Mertz 
In State v. Mertz,35 Trevor Mertz appealed his conviction for burglary, 
arguing the jury instructions given at trial were erroneous.36  Mertz argued 
the judge should have answered a question posed to the court by the jury, 
instead of instructing the jury they had already been given the law in the 
jury instructions.37  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction, concluding the district court had properly instructed the jury.38 
Mertz was charged for burglary for taking a television after entering his 
former girlfriend’s home.39  Mertz testified he loaned the television to his 
former girlfriend, but two of the State’s witnesses testified the television 
belonged to the former girlfriend.40  Following the presentations of both 
sides’ cases the district judge gave the closing jury instructions on 
burglary.41  The judge instructed the jury on the statutory definition of 
burglary then gave the jury the essential elements that the state had to prove 
in this case.42  Nowhere in the definition or in the elements did the judge 
instruct the jury that it needed to find Mertz had intent to commit a specific 
crime after having broken into his ex-girlfriend’s home.43  The jury was not 
given any instruction on theft or any other offense.44  At no time before the 
jury retired for deliberations did Mertz object to the jury instructions 
given.45 
While retired, the jury posed the following question to the court: “Can 
someone be convicted of Burglary if they break into someone else’s home 
for the sole purpose of retrieving their own personal property?  Yes or 
No?”46  After hearing argument from counsel, the judge responded that the 
jury instruction given would stand, and did not answer the question yes or 
no.47  The jury found Mertz guilty of burglary.48 
 
35. 2012 ND 145, 818 N.W.2d 782. 
36. Mertz, ¶ 1, 818 N.W.2d at 783. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. ¶ 2. 
40. Id. at 783-84. 
41. Id. ¶ 3, 818 N.W.2d at 784. 
42. Id.  The judge followed the North Dakota State Bar Association’s recommended 
instruction verbatim.  See STATE BAR ASS’N OF N.D & N.D. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION 
COMM’N, N.D. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § K-9.10 (2011). 
43. Mertz, ¶ 3, 818 N.W.2d at 784. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. ¶ 9, 818 N.W.2d at 785. 
46. Id. ¶ 4, 818 N.W.2d at 784. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. ¶ 6. 
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Mertz argued on appeal the proper response to the jury’s question was 
“no” but also attacked the legal sufficiency of the jury instructions.49  He 
argued the jury instructions needed to include a provision requiring the jury 
find he had intent to commit a specific crime, in this case theft, following 
his break in.50  Because Mertz failed to object to the jury instructions when 
given, review of this issue was for plain error.51 
The statute Mertz was charged under states 
A person is guilty of burglary if he willfully enters or 
surreptitiously remains in a building or occupied structure, or a 
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, when at the time 
the premises are not open to the public and the actor is not 
licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain as the 
case may be, with intent to commit a crime therein.52 
Mertz argued the language “with the intent to commit a crime therein” 
required the State to prove intent to commit some specific crime.53  He 
argued the State did not show he had the intent to commit the specific crime 
of theft because theft involves the unauthorized possession of another 
person’s property,54 while Mertz maintained the television was owned by 
him.55 
In this appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court was forced to interpret 
the meaning of the “intent to commit a crime therein” provision in the 
burglary statute.56  A majority of the court held the statute was not clear on 
its face whether the State needed to prove intent to commit some specific 
crime in a burglary prosecution.57  Since the statute was ambiguous, looking 
at the legislative history was appropriate to determine the legislature’s 
goal.58 
North Dakota Century Code title 12.1 is based on the proposed Federal 
Criminal Code.59  Accordingly, the comments to the proposed Federal 
Criminal Code are helpful in interpreting the North Dakota Criminal 
Code.60  Examining the comments to the section on burglary, the North 
 
49. Id. ¶ 9, 818 N.W.2d at 785. 
50. Id. ¶ 10. 
51. Id. ¶ 9. 
52. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02(1) (2012)). 
53. Id. 
54. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(1) (2012). 
55. Mertz, ¶ 10, 818 N.W.2d at 785. 
56. Id. ¶ 11. 
57. Id. ¶ 12. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 785-86. 
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Dakota Supreme Court noted the precise crime intended to be committed 
was not specified in the code so that a prosecutor would not need to prove 
that precise crime.61  Because the precise crime intended to be committed is 
not an element of burglary, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the 
district court’s jury instruction was correct.62 
Justice Sandstrom concurred in the judgment of the court, but did not 
find the statute to be ambiguous.63  He found the plain words of the statute 
do not require the State to prove intent to commit a specific crime, and so 
he agreed with the majority’s interpretation of the statute.64  Justice 
Sandstrom, therefore, found it inappropriate to consult the official 
comments to the proposed Federal Criminal Code.65 
  
 
61. Id. ¶ 13, 818 N.W.2d at 786. 
62. Id. ¶ 14. 
63. Id. ¶ 20, 818 N.W.2d at 787 (Sandstrom, J., concurring). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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CHILD SUPPORT – APPEAL AND ERROR 
Michiel James Nuveen v. Elizabeth Ann Nuveen 
In Nuveen v. Nuveen,66 Michiel Nuveen appealed from a district court 
judgment that deviated upward from the Child Support Guidelines, ordering 
him to pay $3,620.00 per month in child support.67  Michiel and Elizabeth 
Nuveen were married in 1991.68 During their marriage, they had three 
children together.69  Under a Partial Divorce Judgment entered on October 
16, 2007, Elizabeth was awarded primary custody of all three children.70  
Also pursuant to this judgment, Michiel’s child support was set at $4,250 
per month, the highest guidelines monthly support amount.71 
Subsequent to this Divorce Judgment, one of the Nuveen children 
began residing with Michiel.72  Michiel moved the district court to modify 
the monthly support amount given the new arrangement.73  Based on 
Michiel’s monthly income of more than $42,000 and Elizabeth’s monthly 
income of $6191, the district court subtracted Elizabeth’s presumptive 
support from Michiel’s presumptive support as required by statute.74  
Because under the new arrangement Michiel’s presumptive monthly 
support would be $3543, and Elizabeth’s monthly support would be $1087, 
the district court determined Michiel’s new monthly support obligation was 
$2456.75 
Nevertheless, upon a finding that the children’s needs were more 
expansive than children accustomed to a lower standard of living, and that 
Michiel had an increased ability to pay, the district court found an upward 
deviation Michiel’s child support would be in the best interests of the 
children, and ordered Michiel to pay $3750 per month to Elizabeth.76 
Michiel Nuveen filed a Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial on Child 
Support Motion or in the Alternative for Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order.77  In the motion, Michiel asked the court to 
reconsider the deviation and to correct a mathematical error in calculating 
 
66. 2012 ND 260, No. 20120246, 2012 WL 6582491 (N.D. Dec. 18, 2012). 
67. Nuveen, at *1. 
68. Id. ¶ 2. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. ¶ 3. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. ¶ 4. 
77. Id. ¶ 5, 2012 WL 6582491, at *2. 
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Elizabeth’s income.78  The court granted the motion in correcting the 
mathematical error, but refused to reconsider the upward deviation.79  
Michiel then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, claiming the 
district court erred in granting the deviation.80 
In the North Dakota Supreme Court’s analysis, the court found that the 
presumptive support obligation in the guidelines may be rebutted if, among 
other things, the obligor has an increased ability to pay, and the adjustment 
is in the best interests of the children.81  In this instance, because Michiel’s 
income far exceeds the amount of $12,500 per month, and because his 
monthly entertainment budget is much greater than Elizabeth’s, the facts are 
sufficient to justify the district court’s upward deviation from the 
guidelines.82 
In response to Michiel’s argument that Hegen v. Hegen83 should be 
followed, the court found that the clearly erroneous standard of review 
guided that decision, and such standard must be followed in this case.84  
Because there was sufficient evidence in the record to uphold the district 
court judgment, the court refused to reverse the decision.85  The court 
likewise found that the upward deviation did not require a showing of the 
appropriate needs in specific amounts, in a line-by-line accounting 
fashion.86  The “appropriate needs” analysis allows the court to look to the 
lifestyle a child may expect when the parent’s have substantial income, 
without requiring specific findings of these expanded needs.87 
Lastly, the court refused to find any error as a matter of law in the 
district court’s findings.88  The district court had not misapplied the 
guidelines by determining the deviation after offsetting the parties’ 
presumptive child support amounts.89  The lower court had found that 
Michiel could afford to pay more, not that Elizabeth should pay less.90  
 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. ¶ 6. 
82. Id. ¶ 8, 2012 WL 6582491, at *3. 
83. In Hegen v. Hegen, the Supreme Court upheld a district court ruling, despite argument 
that the non-custodial parent could afford to pay an additional amount.  452 N.W.2d 96, 102 (N.D. 
1990). 
84. Id. ¶¶ 9-10 (citing Hegen v. Hegen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 102 (N.D. 1990)). 
85. Id. ¶ 11. 
86. Id. ¶ 12, 2012 WL 6582491, at *4 (citing Martire v. Martire, 2012 ND 197, ¶ 24, 822 
N.W.2d 450, 462). 
87. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Hegen v. Hegen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 102 (1990)). 
88. Id. ¶ 15. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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Therefore, the district court’s judgment deviating upward from the Child 
Support Guidelines and ordering Michiel Nuveen to pay $3650 per month 
in child support was affirmed.91 
  
 
91. Id. ¶ 16, 2012 WL 6582491, at *5. 
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COMPARATIVE FAULT – DERIVATIVE ACTION OF A PARENT – A 
PARENT’S RIGHT TO RECOVER MEDICAL EXPENSES  PAID 
ON BEHALF OF A CHILD 
M.M. and Thomas Moore v. Fargo Public School District No. 1 
In M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1,92 Thomas Moore 
appealed a judgment dismissing his claim for medical expenses incurred by 
his son, M.M., in their personal injury action against Fargo Public School 
District No. 1 and Eugenia Hart.93  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Moore’s claim for 
medical damages was correctly denied because his past economic damages 
were derived from M.M.’s injuries.94 
In May 2004, M.M., a fifteen year old student at Discovery Middle 
School in Fargo, was injured while practicing a bike stunt in the school 
auditorium.95  The stunt was being practiced in preparation for 60s day, 
which was part of the curriculum for Hart’s history class.96 
Moore and M.M. brought a personal injury action against Hart and the 
District.97  After the district court dismissed their action against the District 
as a matter of law, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district 
court, finding, among other things, it had erred in ruling that the 
recreational immunity statute barred the action against the district, and 
remanded for a new trial.98 
On remand, Hart settled and the case was tried to a jury only against 
the District.99  The jury awarded Moore $285,000 for past economic 
damages based on M.M.’s medical expenses incurred while he was a 
minor.100  The jury allocated thirty percent of the fault to Hart, and seventy 
percent to M.M.101  Because the jury concluded that M.M.’s fault was 
greater than the fault of the District, the court entered judgment dismissing 
the action against the district and awarded costs in its favor.102  The district 
court also denied Moore’s request to have judgment entered in his favor for 
$85,500, which represents thirty percent of the $285,000 award for M.M.’s 
 
92. 2012 ND 79, 815 N.W.2d 273. 
93. M.M., ¶ 1, 815 N.W.2d at 274. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. ¶ 2. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. ¶ 3. 
100. Id. ¶ 3, 815 N.W.2d at 275. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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past medical expenses.103  The district court concluded “a child’s 
negligence should be considered in determining the extent of a parent’s 
recovery against a third party for medical expenses paid.”104 
Moore argued on appeal that the district court erred in rejecting his 
claim for $85,500 in past medical expenses for M.M. because North Dakota 
law allows a parent without fault to recover medical expenses for a child’s 
injury in proportion to the defendant’s fault.105 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing the 
comparative fault provisions of North Dakota Century Code section 32-
03.2-02.106  The court found that in enacting this section, the Legislature 
“clearly intended to replace joint and several liability with several allocation 
of damages among those who commit torts in proportion to the fault of 
those who contributed to an injury.”107  Nevertheless, section 32-03.2-02 
does not create an independent basis for tort liability, but deals only with 
the allocation of damages where parties have already been found to be at 
fault.108  With regard to the modified comparative fault statutes, nothing is 
written concerning whether a parent without fault may recover medical 
expenses for a child’s injuries in proportion to the defendant’s fault when 
the child’s fault exceeds the defendant’s fault.109 
Because nothing is found specifically in the statutes regarding this 
particular matter, the court cited the general doctrine that a parent’s claims 
“for medical expenses paid on behalf of an injured . . . child are derivative, 
and the negligence of the injured family member is attributed to the person 
with the derivative claim.”110  After demonstrating that the weight of 
authority prevented Moore’s recovery in this case, the court looked to 
additional arguments presented by Moore.111 
The court went on to reject Moore’s argument that barring his recovery 
because of M.M.’s negligence violates the plain language and purpose of 
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-21, finding that attributing 
M.M.’s fault to Moore does not impose liability upon Moore for any torts 
that may have been committed by M.M.112 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. ¶ 5. 
106. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 815 N.W.2d at 275-76. 
107. Id. ¶ 7, 815 N.W.2d at 276 (quoting Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead YMCA, 2001 ND 
139, ¶ 25, 632 N.W.2d 407, 417). 
108. Id. ¶ 9. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. ¶ 10 (citing 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 1030, at 294 (2004)). 
111. See id. ¶ 5-17, 815 N.W.2d at 276-80. 
112. Id. ¶ 11, 815 N.W.2d at 277. 
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The court likewise rejected Moore’s argument that his obligation to 
support M.M. under section 14-09-08 somehow distinguished North Dakota 
from those jurisdictions that have adopted the majority rule, and refused to 
follow the Iowa Supreme Court in Handeland v. Brown, because the 
decision is almost forty years old and has received little acceptance outside 
the state of Iowa.113 
Instead, citing Hockema v. J.S., the court discussed the persuasiveness 
of this decision, agreeing with the Indiana court’s analysis of a parent’s 
derivative rights with respect to his children.114  Because of the derivative 
nature of a parent’s right to recover a child’s medical expenses, the parent 
may likewise be barred by the child’s comparative negligence if it exceeds 
that of the tortfeasor.115 
After subsequently rejecting an attempt by Moore to distinguish 
Hockema, as well as leaving the matter of unjust enrichment by the district 
to North Dakota’s Legislature, the court concluded that a parent is not 
entitled to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of an injured minor 
child where the child’s comparative fault is greater than that of the 
tortfeasor.116  Because Moore’s claim for past medical expenses derives 
from M.M.’s injuries, and M.M. was denied recovery under comparative 
fault statutes, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed 
Moore’s claim for M.M.’s medical expenses, and affirmed the district 
court’s judgment.117 
  
 
113. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 815 N.W.2d at 277-78. 
114. Id. ¶ 15, 815 N.W.2d at 279 (citing Hockema v. J.S., 832 N.E.2d 537 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005)). 
115. Id. (citing Hockema v. J.S., 832 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). 
116. Id. ¶ 9, 815 N.W.2d at 279-80. 
117. Id. ¶ 17, 815 N.W.2d at 280. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – NORTH DAKOTA COURTS 
North Dakota State Board of Higher Education v. Al Jaeger, Secretary 
of State, in his official capacity, Fighting Sioux Ballot Measures aka 
Committee For Understanding and Respect 
In North Dakota State Board of Higher Education v. Jaeger,118 the 
North Dakota Supreme Court majority sought to exercise the court’s 
original jurisdiction and decide the constitutionality of the legislative 
enactment requiring the University of North Dakota (UND) to use the 
“Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.119  It concluded that the question of 
the constitutional authority of the Board of Higher Education, in contrast to 
the constitutional authority of the legislature, was properly before the court 
and ready to be decided.120  However, because the necessary number of 
Justices required to decide the merits was lacking, the court denied the 
application of the State Board of Higher Education.121 
The North Dakota Attorney General, as representative of the Board of 
Higher Education (Board), petitioned the court to exercise its original 
jurisdiction and prevent Secretary of State Al Jaeger from placing on the 
June 2012 primary election ballot a referendum measure to reject 2011 
North Dakota Sessions Laws chapter 580 (Senate Bill 2370).122  The 
submission of the referendum reinstated North Dakota Century Code 
section 15-10-46, which requires UND to use the Fighting Sioux nickname 
and logo.123  The Board asked the court to declare section 15-10-46 
unconstitutionally infringes on the Board’s authority for the control and 
administration of UND.124 
Although a majority of the court was willing to exercise its 
discretionary original jurisdiction and consider the underlying constitutional 
issue surrounding the Board’s authority over UND, two members of the 
court disagreed, preventing the four votes necessary under North Dakota 
Constitution article VI, section 4 to declare a legislative enactment 
unconstitutional.125  Because there were not enough members of the court 
willing to decide the constitutional issue at the time, the court declined to 
 
118. 2012 ND 64, 815 N.W.2d 215. 
119. Jaeger, ¶ 1, 815 N.W.2d at 16. 
120. Id. ¶ 1. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. ¶ 2. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. ¶ 2, 815 N.W.2d at 216-17. 
125. Id. ¶ 2, 815 N.W.2d at 217. 
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enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum measure on the 
June 2012 primary election ballot.126 
The court then went on to discuss the history of the UND nickname 
issue.127  In Davidson v. State, the court found a settlement agreement 
between the Board and UND against the NCAA permitted the Board to end 
UND’s use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.128  In response, 
during the 2011 regular legislative session, the legislature enacted section 
15-10-56, requiring UND to continue its use of the “Fighting Sioux.”129  
During the 2011 special legislative session, the legislature repealed section 
15-10-56 through Senate Bill 2370, which likewise provided that neither the 
Board, nor UND could adopt a nickname or logo before 2015.130 
The Secretary of State subsequently approved a referendum petition for 
circulation to North Dakota voters which would repeal Senate Bill 2370.131  
After acquiring a sufficient number of signatures, the Sponsoring 
Committee placed the referendum on the 2012 primary election ballot and 
submitted it to the Secretary of State.132  This effectively reinstated section 
15-10-56, requiring UND to use the Fighting Sioux nickname and logo for 
its intercollegiate teams.133 
On February 17, 2012, the Attorney General, on behalf of the Board, 
petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original 
jurisdiction and enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum 
on the June 2012 primary election ballot.134  The court, on its own motion, 
added the Sponsoring Committee for the referendum petition as a party to 
the proceeding, and subsequently granted the Assembly’s motion to 
intervene.135 
The Board argued that the Court has mandatory original jurisdiction 
under North Dakota Constitution article III, sections 6 and 7 to review 
decisions by the Secretary of State regarding initiative and referendum 
petitions.136  The Board also argued that if the court lacked mandatory 
original jurisdiction to review referendum decisions by the Secretary of 
 
126. Id. 
127. Id. ¶¶ 3-7, 815 N.W.2d at 217-18 
128. Id. ¶ 3, 815 N.W.2d at 217. 
129. Id. ¶ 4 (citing Davidson v. State, 2010 ND 68, ¶¶ 2-7, 781 N.W.2d 73-74). 
130. Id. ¶ 5. 
131. Id. ¶ 6. 
132. Id. at 217-18. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. ¶ 7, 815 N.W.2d at 218. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. ¶ 8. 
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State, it should exercise its discretionary original jurisdiction under North 
Dakota Constitution article VI, section 2.137 
The Secretary of State, the Sponsoring Committee, and the Legislative 
Assembly, on the other hand, responded that the Secretary of State has a 
limited ministerial role when reviewing petitions for a referred measure.138  
They asserted that if the petitions are proper in form and contain the 
requisite number of valid signatures, the Secretary of State must place the 
measure on the ballot without considering the substance or determining the 
constitutionality of the referred measure.139  The Sponsoring Committee 
and the Legislative Assembly argued that constitutionality of North Dakota 
Century Code section 15-10-46 is not ripe for review before the voters have 
an opportunity to vote on the referendum measure.140  The Legislative 
Assembly also argued that the specific language in North Dakota 
Constitution article III, sections 6 and 7 controls the general language for 
the Court’s discretionary original jurisdiction in North Dakota Constitution 
article VI, section 2.141 
Under the mandatory self-executing provisions of North Dakota 
Constitution article III, the Secretary of State’s responsibilities are limited 
to the form and the sufficiency of the petition.142  The court found that the 
Secretary of State’s responsibilities under those provisions do not include 
the authority to review the constitutionality of the measure.143 
The majority also decided that because it has discretionary authority to 
exercise original jurisdiction to issue remedial writs, it must decide whether 
it had original jurisdiction in this case.144  Although the court is required by 
the constitution to review decisions by the Secretary of State regarding the 
form and sufficiency for placement of referendum measures on the ballot, 
those mandatory provisions did not apply to this case because the Board 
never asserted that the Secretary improperly performed his ministerial 
functions.145  Nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, the 
majority concluded it had original jurisdiction in the case.146 
The court then analyzed a number of cases, concluding discretionary 
original jurisdiction for issues involving referendum petitions is not 
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precluded by the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction to review the Secretary of 
State’s decisions under North Dakota Constitution article III.147 
The Attorney General’s petition rose fundamental questions involving 
the prerogatives of the State and the sovereign rights of its people, which 
the Court ruled are statewide interests and go to core issues involving the 
limits of governmental authority in the context of the Board’s authority to 
decide the name and logo for UND’s intercollegiate athletic teams.148  The 
majority essentially found that the Attorney General, on behalf of the 
Board, seeks a declaration on the constitutionality of North Dakota Century 
Code section 15-10-46 and the posture of the issues satisfy the requirements 
for the court to exercise its original jurisdiction in the case.149  Nevertheless, 
although a majority of the court was willing to exercise its discretionary 
original jurisdiction and consider the underlying constitutional issue about 
the Board’s authority over UND, two members concluded this was not an 
appropriate case for the court to exercise its discretionary original 
jurisdiction.150  As a result, the court concluded there were not enough 
members willing to decide the constitutional issue at that time.151 
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CRIMINAL LAW – RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO CONFRONT 
WITNESSES – USE OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
State of North Dakota, ex rel. Nathan Kirke Madden v. The Honorable 
Joshua B. Rustad 
In State ex rel. Madden v. Rustad,152 James Christianson sought to have 
the State produce the Director of the State Crime Laboratory as a witness at 
trial in his prosecution for driving while intoxicated.153  The State opposed 
his objection, and the district court issued an order requiring the Director to 
testify, or the state could not introduce the lab report showing 
Christianson’s blood-alcohol content at the time of arrest.154  The State filed 
a petition for a supervisory writ with the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
asking the court to reverse the district court’s pretrial order.155  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court issued the supervisory writ.156 
Christianson was arrested for suspicion of DUI and agreed to a blood 
draw taken at a Williston hospital.157  The State notified Christianson of its 
intent to introduce the laboratory report analyzing the blood sample under 
North Dakota Rule of Evidence 707.158  Under Rule 707(b), Christianson 
objected to the introduction of the report and identified various witnesses 
requested to testify at trial, including the lab analyst and the Director.159  
The district court ruled the analytic report was inadmissible without the 
testimony of the Director because the plain language of Rule 707(b) says 
the State must produce the person requested by the defendant.160 
 
152. 2012 ND 242, 823 N.W.2d 767. 
153. Rustad, ¶ 2, 823 N.W.2d at 768. 
154. Id. ¶ 3, 823 N.W.2d at 768-69. 
155. Id. ¶ 1, 823 N.W.2d at 768. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. ¶ 2. 
158. Id.  The notice requirement provides: 
If the prosecution intends to introduce an analytical . . . in a criminal trial, it must 
notify the defendant or the defendant's attorney in writing of its intent to introduce the 
report and must also serve a copy of the report on the defendant or the defendant's 
attorney at least 30 days before the trial. 
N.D. R. EVID. 707(a). 
159. Rustad, ¶ 2. 
160. Id. ¶ 3, 823 N.W.2d at 768-69.  The objection provision states: 
At least 14 days before the trial, the defendant may object in writing to the 
introduction of the report and identify the name or job title of the witness to be 
produced to testify about the report at trial.  If objection is made, the prosecutor must 
produce the person requested.  If the witness is not available to testify, the court must 
grant a continuance. 
N.D. R. EVID. 707(b). 
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The State argued first that this case was appropriate for the issuance of 
a writ because the State lacks another adequate remedy.161  The North 
Dakota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as amicus curiae, argued 
the State could have produced the Director, or deposed her and presented 
the deposition at trial, and therefore, the State was so harmed as to require 
the issuance of a supervisory writ.162  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
concluded that this in an extraordinary case, because there very limited 
alternatives for the State to obtain review in a criminal case.163  Either the 
defendant would be acquitted, and under North Dakota Century Code 
section 29-28-07, the State could not appeal,164 or if the defendant were 
convicted, he or she would not raise an issue on appeal about a pretrial 
order that was beneficial to the defendant, and the State would be prevented 
from raising that issue.165  Because there was no other remedy available, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court found this to be an appropriate case to 
exercise its supervisory powers.166 
On the merits, the State argued the witness to be produced by the state 
under Rule 707(b) must only be a person making a testimonial statement.167  
The State’s position was that the Director had not part in the actual conduct 
of the chemical analysis in Christianson’s case and should not have to 
testify.168  Under the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Crawford 
v. Washington, a “witness” whom the State is required to produce at trial 
under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is a person who makes a 
solemn declaration of some fact.169  The North Dakota Supreme Court held 
Rule 707 only covers those witnesses who are considered to have given 
testimonial statements.170  The Director, the court held, made no testimonial 
statements in this case.171  The Director’s only statement was that the lab 
analyst was a “designee” of the Director, and thus qualified to conduct the 
laboratory analysis.172  There was nothing that the Director would have 
been examined about at trial that would have been useful to prove or 
disprove the statements made in the chemical analysis report of 
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Christianson’s blood sample.173  Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court issued a supervisory writ, and directed the district court to vacate its 
pretrial order.174 
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EMINENT DOMAIN – DELEGATION OF POWER – FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATIONS 
SUBORDINATE THERETO 
Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Thomas Anderson 
In Minnkota Power Cooperative v. Anderson,175 several landowners in 
Wells and Sheridan Counties appealed a district court judgment which 
permitted Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. to enter their properties for 
inspection and surveying.176  The North Dakota Supreme Court determined 
that Minnkota, despite being a foreign corporation, was properly entitled to 
exercise the power of eminent domain under North Dakota public utility 
statutes, and could therefore request the inspections.177 
Minnkota is an electricity generating cooperative organized under 
Minnesota law, but authorized as a foreign cooperative to do business in 
North Dakota.178  As part of its operations, Minnkota was planning on 
building a 250 mile transmission line from Center, North Dakota to Grand 
Forks, North Dakota.179  Minnkota first asked landowners along the 
proposed route for permission to conduct surveys and testing, and while 
many landowners consented, several declined.180  In response, Minnkota 
petitioned the district courts of Wells and Sheridan Counties to gain access 
by court order.181  The landowners objected, and moved to dismiss the 
petitions.182  Both the district courts in Wells and Sheridan Counties granted 
Minnkota’s petition.183 
On appeal, the landowners argued foreign cooperatives are not entitled 
to exercise eminent domain because the chapter of the North Dakota 
Century Code which contains the eminent domain power only applies to 
North Dakota cooperatives.184  They argued that since electric cooperatives 
are governed by North Dakota Century Code chapter 10-13 and Minnkota is 
a foreign cooperative operating under chapter 10-15, Minnkota cannot have 
the power of eminent domain granted under chapter 10-13.185 
 
175. 2012 ND 105, 817 N.W.2d 325. 
176. Minnkota, ¶ 1, 817 N.W.2d at 326. 
177. Id. ¶ 16, 817 N.W.2d at 331. 
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First, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted the arguments advanced 
by the landowners required statutory interpretation, which the court 
considers de novo.186  The court highlighted North Dakota Century Code 
section 10-15-52, which grants foreign cooperatives “‘all rights, 
exemptions, and privileges of a cooperative organized for the same 
purposes under the laws of this state.’”187  Since the power of eminent 
domain is a right given to domestic electric cooperatives, Minnkota would 
be entitled to that right as well.188 
Second, the North Dakota Supreme Court explored the ambiguous 
terms of North Dakota Century Code section 10-15-60.189  That section 
provides in part 
All foreign and domestic cooperatives are governed by the 
provisions of this chapter except that they shall not apply to 
cooperatives governed by . . . chapter[] . . . 10-13, . . . except when 
the laws governing such associations clearly adopt or refer to any 
provisions of this chapter or refer to provisions of the general law 
governing cooperatives.190 
The landowners argued that Minnkota is a foreign cooperative operating 
under chapter 10-15, and thus cannot use the eminent domain power under 
chapter 10-13.191  They argued that “cooperative” as defined in chapter 10-
15 precluded the finding that Minnkota could be considered an electric 
cooperative under chapter 10-13.192  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
disagreed, noting that North Dakota Century Code section 10-13-01 permits 
an electric cooperative to be organized under either chapter 10-13, chapter 
10-15, or both.193  Looking at the legislative history surrounding the 
adoption of section 10-15-60, the court noted the intention of the legislature 
was to clear up contradictory organization requirements for cooperatives, 
but also to give cooperatives flexibility to determine under which chapter to 
organize.194  Because Minnkota is a foreign cooperative permitted to do 
business in North Dakota, and an electric cooperative can be organized 
under both chapter 10-13 and/or 10-15, Minnkota is granted all powers as if 
 
186. Id. ¶ 6, 817 N.W.2d at 328.  The court also noted the grant of a certificate of cite 
compatibility by the ND PSC could not confer the power of eminent domain, thus partially 
disagreeing with the Wells County District Court.  Id. 
187. Id. ¶ 8 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-52 (2012)). 
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organized under the laws of North Dakota, including the power of eminent 
domain under chapter 10-13.195  The court held the use of the definition of 
cooperative is not a proper means to limit a foreign cooperative when the 
legislature clearly stated a foreign cooperative, if properly registered in 
North Dakota, has all the powers of a domestic cooperative under state law, 
not just the particular chapter on general cooperative law.196  Accordingly, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court found Minnkota was entitled to use 
eminent domain and could properly petition for survey access to the 
landowner’s property in furtherance of that power.197 
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NUISANCE – DUTY OF CARE FOR ADJOINING PROPERTY 
OWNERS – RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR DAMAGES CAUSE BY 
ENCROACHING TREES 
Richard Herring of Herring Chiropractic Clinic v. Lisbon Partners 
Credit Fund, Ltd. Partnership and Five Star Services 
In Herring v. Lisbon Partners,198 Herring appealed a district court 
summary judgment dismissing his claim against Lisbon Partners and Five 
Star Services for nuisance, negligence, and civil trespass.199  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, holding that it 
had erred in finding that Lisbon Partners and Five Star owed no duty to 
Herring to prevent damage caused by encroachment of branches from their 
tree onto Herring’s property.200 
Herring owns a commercial building in Lisbon which houses his 
chiropractic business.201  The adjoining property is owned by Lisbon 
Partners and managed by Five Star.202  Branches from a large tree on the 
Lisbon property overhung onto Herring’s property and brushed against his 
building.203  For many years, Herring trimmed back the encroaching 
branches and cleaned out his downspouts and gutters, which were clogged 
by leaves, twigs and debris from the branches.204  Herring claimed that the 
encroaching branches had caused damage to his building by creating water 
and ice dams to build up on his roof, which eventually led to more 
significant damage.205  After Lisbon and Five Star denied responsibility for 
the damages, Herring sued them for the cost of repairs to his building, 
claiming they had committed civil trespass and negligence, and had 
maintained a nuisance by breaching their duty to maintain and trim the tree 
so that it did not cause damage to his property.206  The district court 
dismissed Herrings claims, concluding that Lisbon Partners and Fives Star 
had no duty to trim or maintain the tree, but that Herring could trim the 
branches back at his own expense.207 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found Herring’s appeal valid 
because, although an appeal from an order granting summary judgment is 
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not appealable, the appeal is treated as an appeal from a judgment because a 
consistent judgment was entered in this case.208 
The first part of the court’s analysis involved a discussion of the four 
different approaches used by courts around the country regarding a 
landowner’s duty to maintain and trim trees on his land, which encroach 
and cause damage to the property of adjoining landowners.209  Under the 
“Massachusetts rule,” a landowner has no liability to neighboring 
landowners for damages caused by encroachment.210  The neighboring 
landowner’s remedy is limited to self-help.211  Under the “Hawaii rule,” the 
owner of a tree may be held liable when encroaching branches or roots 
cause harm, or create imminent danger of causing harm, beyond merely 
casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit.212  However, a 
landowner may always cut away, only to his property line above or below 
the surface of the ground, any part of the adjoining owner’s trees or other 
plant life.213  The “Restatement rule,” from the Second Restatement of 
Torts, finds that an artificially planted or maintained tree may be a nuisance 
and impose liability on the landowner.214  However, there is no liability for 
a naturally growing tree which encroaches on neighboring land.215  Lastly, 
the “Virginia rule,” makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious 
trees.216  Under this rule, damages are available for encroachment by a 
damage-causing noxious tree, but damage caused by encroachment of a 
non-noxious tree is limited to self-help.217 
After analyzing the various rules, the court surmised that under any of 
the rules, regardless of the circumstances, the adjoining landowner would 
have the right to self-help, allowing him to cut back the intruding branches 
and roots to his property line at his own expense.218 
The court then disagreed with the district courts analysis, finding that 
its decision, as well as section 47-01-12, conflict with the more specific 
section 47-01-17 of the North Dakota Century Code.219  Because section 
47-01-17 contains a particular provision with respect to tree ownership, that 
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section would take precedence over the conflicting portion of 47-01-12, and 
requires vesture of ownership of the entire tree in that individual who owns 
the trunk of the tree.220  The Supreme Court then concluded that the 
“Hawaii rule,” which is expressly based on the concept that the owner of 
the trunk of the tree owns the entire tree, more fully gives effect to both 
statutory provisions.221  The court likewise found that, in addition to 
comporting most closely with North Dakota statutory law, the Hawaii 
approach is the most fair and well-reasoned of the four approaches because 
it recognizes the tree owner’s ownership and responsibility for the entire 
tree, while also protecting the neighboring landowner’s right to everything 
above and below the surface of his land.222  Furthermore, the other 
approaches have either been widely criticized, or been adopted in very few 
jurisdictions.223 
Upon adopting the Hawaii rule, the court reversed the district court and 
held that the owners of the encroaching tree were not liable for any 
damages caused by the tree dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit.224  However, 
remanded the issue whether there was a material factual dispute regarding 
whether damages have resulted from the tree’s branches physically scraping 
Herring’s building.225  If Herring is able to present evidence establishing 
damages caused by the tree’s branches physically contacting the building, 
Lisbon Partners and Five Star would be liable for such damages under the 
Hawaii rule.226 
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